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Abstract 
Prior studies have documented that stock returns are abnormally high during the years following 
share repurchases and abnormally low following seasoned equity offerings, relative to various 
benchmarks of expected returns.  While we confirm this evidence in the event data as of 2002, we do 
not find robust long-run abnormal returns following either stock repurchases or issuances after 2002. 
Institutional ownership of event stocks has increased substantially in the recent decade, which helps 
to explain the disappearance of the abnormal performance following corporate stock transactions. 
The evidence seems consistent with the improved stock market efficiency in recent years, 
accompanied by reduced trading costs, popularization of algorithmic trading, and increased 
institutional investment activity, as documented by a number of recent studies. Also consistent with 
the improved market efficiency, fewer firms in the recent years conduct stock repurchases or 
seasoned equity offerings for the purpose of timing the market.  
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1. Introduction 
A number of studies have shown that long run stock returns are abnormally high following 
stock repurchases and abnormally low following stock offerings. 1  Although in principle these 
findings could be due to the “bad” model of expected returns (Fama, 1998), the results appear 
robust across various benchmarks of expected returns.2 The evidence of long-run abnormal returns 
following stock repurchases and offerings potentially implies market inefficiency.  In particular, the 
results are consistent with the “market timing” hypothesis, whereby firms issue stock when 
overpriced and repurchase stock when undervalued. The hypothesis assumes that the market fails 
to incorporate information fully at the event announcement. As a result of investor underreaction at 
announcement, long run abnormal returns are observed as information is slowly incorporated into 
the stock price. 
The stock market in the recent decade witnesses a substantial reduction in trading costs, a wide 
adoption of algorithmic trading, an aggressively rising institutional ownership, and a proliferation 
of hedge funds actively seeking for profitable opportunities. All of them contribute to an explosive 
increase in institutional investor trading and a more efficient stock market (Chordia, Roll, and 
Subramanyam, 2011). Given the dynamics of the market environment, in this study we further 
scrutinize the evidence of long-run abnormal returns. We employ several widely-used but different 
                                                                 
1 See Ritter (1991) for early documentation of negative long-run abnormal returns following IPOs, Loughran 
and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) for early documentation of negative long-run abnormal 
returns following seasoned equity offerings, and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, Vermaelen (1995) for early 
documentation of positive long-run abnormal returns following stock repurchases. 
2 See Ritter (2003) for robust evidence on SEOs, and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) for robust evidence on 
repurchases. The evidence of underperformance following IPOs is less robust, see, for instance, Gompers and 
Lerner (2003). 
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methods of long-run abnormal return estimation, and more importantly, extend the sample to the 
most recent years. For the estimation of long-run abnormal returns, we use the calendar-time 
portfolio approach (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), Ibbotson‟s (1975) return across time and securities 
(IRATS), and the buy-and-hold returns relative to control firms matched on size, the book-to-market 
equity ratio, and the prior return (Barber, Lyon, and Tsai, 1999). Our sample is the most 
comprehensive to date, containing 14,538 stock repurchases in the period of 1985-2010 and 6,733 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in 1980-2010.3  
We confirm previous studies as in the sample of events up to 2002, long-run abnormal returns 
are significantly positive following stock repurchases and significantly negative following SEOs.  
However, in the sample after 2002, we find neither outperformance following repurchases nor 
underperformance following SEOs. The results are robust to different methods of assessing 
abnormal returns4 and different holding periods following the events. Since the sample of events in 
2003-2010 contains 3,773 stock repurchases (26% of the total sample) and 1,671 SEOs (25% of the 
total sample) and moreover, abnormal performance exists for subsamples of similar size/time-span 
in the earlier periods, the results are not driven by low statistical power of our tests with the recent 
sample. That the results from the earlier periods fail to persist for both stock repurchases and 
issuances suggests a fundamental change in the stock market and the economics of corporate stock 
transactions. 
                                                                 
3 Most existing studies on this topic examine the data of repurchases and SEOs prior to 2002. For example, 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) examine repurchases during 1991-2001. Ritter (2003) surveys evidence on SEOs 
during 1970-2000. 
4 SEO stocks  still underperform under IRATS, but both the economic magnitude and statistical significance of 
the underperformance reduce substantially in the sample after 2002. 
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Our findings are consistent with the stock market becoming more efficient in recent years. The 
improvement in market efficiency is likely a result of reduced trading costs, improved trading 
technology, and the increased institutional ownership and trading. Studies have shown that 
institutional ownership has been increasing over time, and more aggressively so in the recent 
decade (e.g., Friedman, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Asquith, 
Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Blume and Keim, 2008), and that stock price efficiency improves with 
higher institutional ownership (e.g., Badrinath, Kale, and Noe, 1995; Sias and Starks, 1997; Bartov, 
Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky, 2000; Nagel, 2003; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009). Meanwhile, the 
decimalization in 2001 significantly reduces trading costs and improves market quality 
(Bessembinder, 2003). Further, technology change has revolutionized the way of trading stocks. 
Algorithmic trading, which started just in the mid-1990s, is now responsible for over 70% of the 
total trading volume. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) suggest that algorithmic trading 
significantly improves liquidity and makes pricing more efficient. Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam 
(2011) show that trading activity has increased substantially in the recent decade, especially for 
stocks with high institutional ownership. They further demonstrate that the stock market becomes 
more efficient over time, as a result of more institutional trading.  
Echoing this general trend, we show that, in our event firms, institutional ownership becomes 
increasingly dominant in the post-2002 period. For example, only 34% of the repurchasing firms 
before 2002 have institutional ownership above 50%; it increases to 69% after 2002. Similarly, the 
percentage of SEO firms having a majority of institutional ownership increases from 23% before 
2002 to 50% after 2002. We examine the long-run stock returns of the event stocks with high and 
low institutional ownership. Consistent with institutional activity improving market efficiency, we 
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find that high institutional ownership significantly reduces the chance and the magnitude of 
abnormal returns. 
Improved market efficiency results in fewer market-timing opportunities. Indeed, we find that 
both repurchasing and SEO firms in the recent years indicate less of the features of market-timers. 
Compared with those in the early years, repurchasing firms have lower book-to-market ratios and 
higher returns and SEO firms have higher book-to-market ratios and lower returns prior to the 
announcements. This suggests that recent corporate stock transactions are more likely motivated by 
other incentives than exploiting mispricing. The market reactions to repurchase and SEO 
announcements are also consistent with the shift in firm motivation and suggest more efficiency of 
the market. In particular, compared with those in the early years, the announcement returns in the 
recent years are significantly less positive for repurchasing firms and less negative for SEO firms. In 
multiple regressions, we show that the differences in announcement returns between the early and 
later periods are well explained by proxies for event firms‟ motivations such as pre-event 
(mis)valuation, investment opportunities, profitability, and cash abundance. Instead of timing the 
market in the early years, more of the event firms in the recent years use repurchases to distribute 
excess cash and conduct SEOs to raise investment capital. 
In sum, we document the disappearance of long-run abnormal returns following stock 
repurchases and SEOs in the recent years and suggest that the increased institutional activities and 
improved market efficiency are likely the contributing forces. Our study adds to the literature about 
the persistence of market anomalies. In the Abstract of his survey article, Schwert (2003) points out 
“After they are documented and analyzed in the academic literature, anomalies often seem to disappear, 
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reverse, or attenuate. …many of the well-known anomalies in the finance literature do not hold up in different 
sample periods.” To illustrate this point, he presents empirical evidence to show that the size effect, 
the value effect, the weekend effect, the dividend yield effect, and the small-firm turn-of-the-year 
effect are such anomalies. He further suggests “…the activities of practitioners who implement strategies 
to take advantage of anomalous behavior can cause the anomalies to disappear (as research findings cause the 
market to become more efficient)”. Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2011) examine a large set of 
previously identified predictors of returns and find that cross-sectional predictability has decreased 
considerably in recent years, both statistically and economically. For instance, the profitability of 
momentum strategies shows no significance for liquid stocks in recent years. Other predictors such 
as share turnover, dispersion of analyst forecasts, post-earnings announcement drift, and 
accounting accruals are not consistently significant in later years and lose significance completely 
for NYSE/AMEX stocks. 
Echoing the improved pricing efficiency, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2011) document 
an explosion in stock trading activities especially since 2002. They identify significant reductions in 
trading costs, improved trading technology, and the proliferation of hedge funds as the driving 
forces. More importantly, they suggest that the upswing of trading volume is mainly contributed by 
institutional investors. Further evidence suggests that institutions are able to trade more effectively 
both on private information and on findings about cross-sectional return predictability. As a result 
of the increased arbitrage activities, stock prices conform more closely to random walks and the 
market becomes more efficient in recent years. Consistent with their arguments, we confirm in this 
study the significant role by institutional investors in eliminating long-run abnormal returns 
following corporate stock transactions.  
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Our study is also close in spirits to Gompers and Lerner (2003). Given that the prior evidence 
on underperformance following IPOs is based on the post-Nasdaq data, they undertake an out-of-
sample study by examining U.S. IPOs from 1935 to 1972. In contrast to the findings of IPO 
underperformance in the post-Nasdaq data, they find no robust abnormal performance following 
IPOs in the pre-Nasdaq period. Like them, we show that the abnormal performance following share 
repurchases and SEOs also depends on the time period examined, in addition to estimation 
methods. Unlike them, we argue that the recent improvement in market efficiency contributes to the 
disappearance of abnormal performance. The reminder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 
describes the data of share repurchases and SEOs, and introduces the various estimation methods of 
long-run abnormal returns. Section 3 presents the results of long-run abnormal returns. In Section 4, 
we explore potential explanations for the disappearance of long-run abnormal returns after 2002. 
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Data and empirical methodology 
2.1. Sample of stock repurchases and SEOs 
We obtain the sample of stock repurchases and seasoned equity offerings from Securities Data 
Company‟s (SDC) U.S. database. The sample is required to have monthly stock return data 
available in CRSP. Our sample of repurchases contains 14,538 open market repurchases of common 
stocks announced during the period from January 1985 to December 2010.5  Repurchases by tender 
offers or privately negotiation are excluded in the sample. If a firm makes multiple announcements 
                                                                 
5 The earliest comprehensive data of share repurchases available in SDC start from 1985. 
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of open market repurchases in a year, only the first announcement is counted. Our sample of SEOs 
consists of 6,733 new issues of common stocks by industrial firms announced and completed during 
the period from January 1980 to December 2010. Repurchases and SEOs by financial institutions or 
utility firms are excluded in the sample. Table 1 presents the sample distribution by calendar years. 
Compared with the samples of previous long-run stock return studies on these two events, our 
sample is most comprehensive in terms of both the length of sample period and the number of 
event observations.  
2.2. Estimation of long-run abnormal returns 
The estimation of long-run abnormal returns has been controversial. 6  Given the lack of 
consensus on the best method and also for the purpose of result robustness, we employ three 
different methods to estimate long-run abnormal returns, respectively, 1) the calendar time 
portfolio approach (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000); 2) Ibbotson‟s (1975) returns across time and 
securities (IRATS); and 3) the buy-and-hold abnormal returns relative to the control firms matched 
on size, the book-to-market equity ratio, and the prior 6-month return (Barber, Lyon, and Tsai, 1999). 
All three methods are widely used in previous studies on long-run abnormal returns.  
In the calendar time portfolio approach, in each month we construct an event portfolio of firms 
that have announced stock repurchases or issuances in the past T months, where T is the holding 
period. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly to add the event firms that have just announced a 
repurchase or an SEO and drop the firms that reach the end of the holding period. We compute the 
                                                                 
6 See Kothari and Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon (1997), Fama (1998), Mitchell  and Stafford (2000), Eckbo, 
Masulis, and Norli (2000), Schultz (2003), Butler and Wan (2010) among others. 
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monthly equal-weighted portfolio excess returns and run a time-series regression of the portfolio 
excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) three factors, 
                                              .   (1) 
     is the event portfolio return in calendar month t. The regression intercepts    measure the 
average monthly abnormal return for event portfolio p over the holding period.  
In the Ibboston‟s (1975) return across time and security (IRATS) method, we run the following 
regression in each event month  : 
                                              ,     (2) 
where     is the return on stock   in the calendar month   that corresponds to the event month  , 
         with     being the month of the event announcement. The reported abnormal returns 
during the holding period are sums of the regression intercepts, i.e.,    
 
   . The standard error 
used to compute the t-statistic is the square root of the sum of the squares of the monthly standard 
errors. 
We follow Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1999) to estimate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. First, 
we select a control firm for each sample firm. At the end of each June, we construct size deciles for 
the following 12 months based on the June market capitalization of NYSE stocks, and then assign 
AMEX and Nasdaq stocks into the appropriate NYSE size deciles based on their market cap in June. 
We further cut the smallest size decile into quintiles of equal number of stocks. As a result,  we 
obtain 14 size portfolios in total. In the meantime, we sort all the firms at the end of June into deciles 
based on the book-to-market equity ratio (B/M), again using the breakpoints of NYSE firms. The 
book-to-market equity ratio is defined as the previous fiscal year end book value of equity divided 
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by the market capitalization at the previous calendar year end. The independent double-sorting 
results in 140 size and B/M portfolios. For each event firm, we select a control firm from the same 
size and B/M portfolio in the month before announcement that has the closest match on the prior 6-
month return and has not involved in the same type of event (repurchase or SEO) in the prior 36 
months. If the control firm is delisted before the end of the holding period, we use the second closet 
match firm as the replacement (and the third closet if the second closest is also delisted later). The 
long-run abnormal return is the difference in the buy-and-hold return between the event and the 
control firms: 
     
           
 
                   
 
   .    (3) 
The skewness of buy-and-hold returns may lead to biased inferences when using standard 
parametric test (Barber, Lyon, and Tsai, 1999), we use the bootstrap method to conduct significance 
tests. In particular, we randomly select n observations from our original sample, with replacement 
to create new samples. Each new sample contains n elements, and we get the median of the new 
sample. We repeat the procedure for 1000 times, and the standard deviation is constructed from the 
1000 subsample medians. 
We examine the abnormal returns for the holding periods of 24, 36, and 48 months. Overall, the 
results are consistent for different holding periods using all three estimation methods of abnormal 
returns. For the sake of brevity, in the paper we only report the abnormal returns for the holding 
period of 36 months.  
 
3. Empirical results of long-run abnormal returns 
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Table 2 reports the long-run abnormal return results. In the full sample, we confirm the 
findings of prior studies that the three-year abnormal stock returns are significantly positive 
following share repurchases and significantly negative following SEOs. All the three methods of 
long-run abnormal return estimation yield consistent results, even comparable in magnitude (the 
reported abnormal returns under the calendar time approach are monthly while those under the 
other two methods are for 36 months). Roughly speaking, in the three years following the 
announcement, repurchasing firms on average realize about 8-10% positive returns while SEO firms 
incur about 11-15% negative returns relative to the various benchmarks. Both are statistically 
significant at the 1% level regardless of the estimation methods. 
However, a closer examination shows that the long-run abnormal returns are significant only 
in the sample up to 2002. In the sample of 2003-2010, we find neither significant outperformance 
following repurchases nor significant underperformance following SEOs, under almost all three 
methods of long-run abnormal return estimation (hereafter we denote the sample up to 2002 the 
early sample and the sample after 2002 the later sample). The only exception is the abnormal return 
of SEOs under IRATS where significant underperformance is still observed in the later sample, but 
the 36-month abnormal return drops from -15% to -9.5% in magnitude (the associated t-statistic 
drops from -9.44 to -2.50). Under IRATS, the abnormal returns following repurchases even become 
significantly negative in the later sample. Most existing studies on these two events end their 
sampling before 2002. For example, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) examine open-
market repurchases announced in the period of 1980-1990 and find significantly positive returns 
over several years following the announcement. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) investigate open-
market repurchases in the following period of 1991-2001 and claim the persistence of superior long-
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run returns following repurchases during that period. After surveying a number of earlier studies, 
Ritter (2003) suggests that the return underperformance following SEOs in the period of 1970-2000 
are robust. At the minimum, our study provides out-of-sample empirical results that sharply 
contrast to the earlier findings and cast doubt on the persistence of long-run abnormal returns over 
time.  
Since the standard errors used to evaluate the significance of abnormal returns would decline 
with a longer time series of data, there is a concern that the lack of significance in the late period 
might be due to lack of statistical power. Our sample of 2003-2010 is perhaps not long, but it is not 
short either. It has eight years out of the total of 24 years for repurchases and the total of 29 years for 
SEOs. In terms of the number of observations, the later sample consists of 26% of the total 
repurchase sample and 24.8% of the total SEO sample. Nevertheless, we conduct two checks to 
address this concern. First, we separate the early sample into subsamples with eight years of data, 
and then re-estimate the abnormal returns of the subsamples. In untabulated results, we confirm the 
significance of the abnormal performance for both events in the subsamples. In fact, earlier studies 
that document these two anomalies do not have long time-series event data. Second, we compare 
the standard errors of the abnormal returns across the early and later periods. While the standard 
errors for SEOs are slightly higher in the later period, those for repurchases are not significantly 
different in the two periods. More importantly, we do observe significant reductions in the 
magnitude of abnormal returns. Some even flip the signs. Overall, the lack of statistical power does 
not seem to explain the disappearance of abnormal performance of the sample firms after 2002.  
Moreover, stock repurchases and offerings are important corporate stock transactions with 
many opposite features. We observe the disappearance of both outperformance and 
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underperformance following these two contrasting events. This complexity also mitigates the 
concern of our findings being a data-snooping outcome. 
 
4. What explains the disappearance of long-run abnormal returns? 
It is intriguing that significant long-run abnormal returns are not observed following the 
announcements of the repurchases and SEOs after 2002. In this section, we explore potential reasons 
and argue that the disappearance is consistent with the increased stock market efficiency in this 
later period, evidenced by (1) increased arbitrage activities by institutional investors and (2) 
reduced market-timing motivations for corporate stock transactions.  
4.1. More effective arbitrage by institutional investors 
Institutional ownership of U.S. stocks has been increasing in the last few decades (Friedman, 
1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; 
Blume and Keim, 2008; among others).  As illustrated in Figure 1, the median institutional 
ownership for CRSP stocks has increased steadily from less than 4% in March 1980 to 40% by the 
end of 2010. In particular, the increase during this time period is from about 10% to 50% for NYSE 
and AMEX stocks and from almost nil to 40% for NASDAQ stocks. The financial markets in the last 
decade are also marked by a proliferation of hedge funds that actively search for profit 
opportunities. In his AFA presidential address, French (2008) shows that the assets managed by 
hedge funds grow from $456.4 billion in 2000 to $1464.5 billion in 2007, or by 320%. The active 
investment activities by hedge funds are supposed to make the market prices more efficient. 
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The cost of trading stocks has been declining during this time period (see, e.g., French, 2008). In 
2001, the NYSE, subsequently followed by the Nasdaq Stock Market, adopted a change to reduce 
the minimum price increment, or tick size, to one cent (a move commonly referred to as 
“decimalization”). This regulatory change significantly reduces trading costs and improves market 
quality (Bessembinder, 2003). Based on proprietary data of some large institutions trading NYSE 
stocks, Chakravarty, Panchapagesan, and Wood (2005) show institutional trading costs decline 
substantially following the decimalization, especially for those orders not demanding immediate 
liquidity. Further, the advent of technology has facilitated institutions to execute automated 
algorithmic trading, which was first implemented in the mid-1990s but has grown to be responsible 
for as much as 73% of the total trading volume of U.S. stocks in 2009.7 Hendershott, Jones, and 
Menkveld (2011) suggest that algorithmic trading substantially improves liquidity, facilitates 
hedging, and makes stock prices more efficient. Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2011) show that, 
as a result of the lower cost and the improved technology, stock trading activity explodes in recent 
years and the upswing is primarily contributed by institutional investors. Further evidence suggests 
the stock market becomes more efficient as a result of more institutional trading. Intraday volatility 
has decreased and stock prices conform more closely to random walks in recent years.  
The evidence that institutional investors improve market efficiency is ubiquitous. Institutional 
investors arguably are more effective than individual investors in collecting and processing 
information. Institutional trading speeds up price adjustment to new information (Badrinath, Kale, 
and Noe, 1995; Sias and Starks, 1997). D‟Avolio (2002) shows that stock loans are primarily supplied 
by institutions and thus stocks with low institutional ownership are more short-sale constrained. 
                                                                 
7 See “SEC runs eye over high-speed trading,” Financial Times, July 29, 2009. 
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Mispricing of stocks with low institutional ownership is more difficult to arbitrage away. 
Consequently, stocks with higher institutional ownership are more efficiently priced, suggested by 
prices conforming more to random walks (Boehmer and Kelley, 2009), and the less likelihood of 
cross-sectional return anomalies (Nagel 2005). Similarly, Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000) 
show that high institutional ownership significantly mitigates the post earnings announcement drift, 
while Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) provide evidence that transient institutional investors trade 
actively to exploit such a drift.  
Inspired by these studies, we examine whether the sharp increase in institutional activities 
helps to explain the disappearance of long-run abnormal returns. Being the marginal investor of 
stocks, institutional investors might improve pricing efficiency in two ways: (1) a stock with a high 
level of institutional ownership has a lower chance of mispricing in the first place; (2) in case 
mispricing occurs, institutional investors can be more effective in identifying it and then arbitraging 
it away. Due to the lack of detailed institutional trading data, we are not ambitious to examine how 
institutions prevent and eliminate mispricing. Rather, we try to identify the potential relations 
between institutional ownership and the findings of long-run abnormal returns, and examine how 
the pattern has changed after 2002.   
We obtain the quarterly data of institutional ownership from Thomson Financial‟s 13f. For each 
event stock, we compute its aggregate institutional ownership (IO) at the end of the quarter before 
the announcement. Figure 1 presents the time-series median IO respectively for repurchasing and 
SEO firms, along with the median IO of all CRSP firms. As the market median IO rising, it is not 
surprising to observe that the median IO for both repurchasing and SEO firms also increase 
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substantially over time. Interestingly, they both passed above the level of 50% since 2003 (but the 
median IO of SEO firms drops sharply in 2009-10).   
Without loss of generality, we assume that institutional investors are able to deliver a 
reasonably good job of arbitrage for a stock (i.e., prevent and correct mispricing) if they in aggregate 
hold over 50% of this stock.8 We classify our sample into two groups, high IO group and low IO 
group, based on if the stock‟s institutional ownership in the quarter before the announcement is 
above or below 50%. Panel A of Table 3 shows the number of event firms in the two groups over 
calendar years. Not surprisingly, in the early years, more of the sample firms fall into the low IO 
group. But the pattern changes over time. In the recent years, more of the sample, both 
repurchasing and SEO firms, fall into the high IO group (SEOs in the last two years are an 
exception). As summarized in Panel B, in the early sample of 1985-2002, institutional investors in 
aggregate hold the majority of shares in only 34% of the repurchasing firms and this ratio increases 
to 69% for the repurchasing firms in 2003-2010. Similarly, in the period of 1980-2002, institutional 
investors are the majority shareholders for only 23% of the SEO firms, while they are the majority 
shareholders for over 50% of the SEO firms in 2003-2010.  
Next we examine whether the long-run abnormal returns are related to the stocks‟ institutional 
ownership. Table 4 presents the long-run abnormal returns, respectively for the low and high IO 
groups, in the full sample and further in the early and later subsamples. A clear message emerges 
from the results: high institutional holding significantly mitigates the long-run mispricing of event 
stocks. For share repurchases, the positive long-run abnormal returns are much less in magnitude in 
                                                                 
8 Our following results are robust to alternative levels of cutting, such as 40% or 45%.  
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the high IO group than in the low IO group, both in the full and early samples. In the later sample, 
the positive abnormal returns disappear in both the high and the low IO groups. Similarly, for SEO 
firms with high IO, the long-run abnormal returns are either less negative (in the early period), or 
completely disappear (in the later period). In contrast, the low-IO SEO firms incur negative 
abnormal returns both in the early and the later periods. The results largely hold across different 
estimation methods. Since 66% of the repurchasing firms and 77% of the SEO firms in the early 
sample have low IO (as illustrated in Panel B of Table 3) and they realize significant long-run 
abnormal returns (as illustrated in Table 4), they dominate in the early sample and produce positive 
abnormal returns following repurchases and negative abnormal returns following SEOs. In the later 
sample of 2003-2010, however, 69% of the repurchasing firms and over 50% of the SEO firms have 
high IO and incur neither outperformance nor underperformance following these two events, they 
dominate in the later sample and thus produce no or at least less significant long-run abnormal 
performance on average.  
Although evidence clearly suggests that high institutional ownership diminishes long-run 
abnormal returns, it would be too hasty to give full credits to the increase in institutional ownership 
for the disappearance of long-run abnormal returns. In the early sample, even for the subsample of 
event firms with above 50% of IO, we still observe significantly positive abnormal returns following 
repurchases and negative abnormal returns following SEOs. We argue that the relatively higher 
trading cost in the early period as a limit to arbitrage is daunting for active trading even to many 
institutional investors. As discussed earlier, Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2011) find that the 
more recent increase in trading is most significant for firms with high institutional ownership. The 
relatively lower liquidity could explain the existence of the anomalies even in firms with above 50% 
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of IO in the early period, which is consistent with Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2008) who 
suggests that liquidity facilitates market efficiency.  
As a robustness check, we also examine another measure of limit to arbitrage - idiosyncratic 
volatility (IV) – and see how it is related to the long-run abnormal returns. We use the median IV of 
all CRSP stocks in the early period and divide sample firms into two groups: high (above the 
median) and low (below the median) IV firms. Intuitively, we expect that the abnormal 
performance is more significant in high IV firms because the cost of arbitrage is higher with greater 
idiosyncratic volatility. Indeed, we find similar results (not reported for brevity) as using 
institutional ownership above. The effect of IV on the abnormal performance is more pronounced in 
the later sample – abnormal performance disappears in the event stocks with relatively low IV.  
4.2. Change in firm motivations 
Market timing has been a popular explanation for the findings of long-run abnormal returns 
following corporate stock transactions. Managers with information advantage time the market by 
selling new shares when they are overpriced and buying back stocks when they are undervalued. 
The market is not efficient enough to eliminate the mispricing – investors underreact to the 
information at announcement. As a result, we observe abnormally positive returns following 
repurchases and abnormally negative returns following SEOs. Market timing is often regarded as 
one important motivation for firms to repurchase and issue shares. 
If the market becomes more efficient in recent years, there should be less market timing 
opportunity for firms to sell overpriced shares or buy back underpriced shares. We test this 
prediction by investigating whether fewer of the event firms after 2002 are market timers relative to 
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those in the early years and whether other motivations than market timing prevail for the 
repurchases and SEOs in the recent years.   
4.2.1 Univariate analysis 
Evidence used to support the market timing hypothesis includes that (1) repurchasing (SEO) 
firms are often under- (over-) valued at the time of announcement, as indicated by their abnormally 
high (low) book-to-market equity ratio (B/M), and (2) repurchasing (SEO) firms tend to have 
abnormally poor (superior) returns in the year before the announcement, which lead to the 
mispricing and managers‟ decision of the event. The reasons of using B/M and the prior stock 
return to infer event firm mispricing are straightforward. Market value of equity being the 
denominator, we expect to observe an abnormally high (low) B/M for an undervalued (overvalued) 
firm. Mispricing is more of a temporary phenomenon (that‟s why it is often described as “windows 
of opportunity”); an undervalued (overvalued) firm is thus expected to have experienced 
abnormally low (high) returns in the preceding year. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) show that the 
prior-year return is the best predictor of the future long-run returns in the case of share repurchases, 
and deem it a strong support of the market timing hypothesis. We examine whether these two 
patterns established in the prior literature have changed after 2002.  
Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) show that the underperformance following equity issuances 
is most evident in small firms. Since small firms are more likely to be mispriced than large firms 
(asset pricing anomalies are often more significant in small firms), we also examine if firm size, 
measured as market capitalization as of the month prior to the announcement, plays a role in the 
disappearance of long-run abnormal returns. 
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We compare the B/M, prior 12-month return, and the market cap of the event firms with their 
contemporaneous industry median. Both the book value and the market value of equity are 
measured before the announcement, specifically, the book value of equity at the previous fiscal year 
end and the market value at the previous month end. The prior 12-month return is the buy-and-
hold return in the 12 months immediately before the announcement. Market capitalization is 
measured at the end of the month before the announcement, adjusted by the CPI to December 2002 
dollars and expressed in logarithm. Firms are classified into 48 industries following Fama and 
French (1997). For each industry in each month, we also compute the median B/M and market 
capitalization (CPI-adjusted, in logarithm) and the value-weighted portfolio return as the 
benchmarks for the event firms. Table 5 shows the means of these three industry-adjusted 
characteristics, respectively for the full sample, and the early and later subsamples. 
The results can be summarized as follows. In the full as well as the early samples, repurchasing 
firms on average have a significantly higher B/M ratio than their industry median before the 
announcement, suggesting undervaluation a possible trigger for the repurchases. More importantly, 
if we compare the early with the later samples, the average difference in B/M between the 
repurchasing firm and its industry median reduces substantially, from 0.07 to 0.01, and the drop is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In the later sample after 2002, repurchasing firms on average 
do not have a significantly higher B/M ratio than their industry median. The evidence on the prior 
12-month returns is also informative. In the early sample, repurchasing firms on average incur 9% 
more negative return in the year before the announcement than their contemporaneous industry 
return, indicating possible undervaluation of repurchasing firms. Repurchasing firms after 2002, 
however, do not realize significantly lower returns than the industry on average. Together with the 
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B/M evidence, we argue that, in the recent years, fewer repurchases than those in the early years 
are motivated by market timing, as they do not seem undervalued in the first place.  
The evidence on SEOs leads us to make a similar conclusion – fewer of the SEOs in the recent 
years are carried out for the purpose of timing the market. We find that, compared with the SEO 
firms in the early years, recent SEO firms have significantly higher B/M ratios and lower returns in 
the year before announcements. The B/M ratios of SEO firms in the recent years are not 
significantly different from their industry peers. However, SEO firms in the later sample still realize 
significantly higher prior returns than their industry average. Stock overvaluation might still be a 
trigger for some SEOs, but compared to the early years, market timing becomes less important as a 
motivation.  
Regarding firm size, both repurchasing and SEO firms appear to be larger than their industry 
median. This pattern remains for repurchasing firms over time but the size dominance over 
industry median shrinks for SEO firms in the later sample, suggesting more small firms conduct 
SEOs in the recent years. Since mispricing is more likely to occur in small firms, repurchasing firm 
size remaining the same and the reduction of SEO firm size do not explain the overall 
disappearance of long-run abnormal returns in the recent years, they, however, might explain why 
the disappearance for SEO firms is not as significant as that for repurchasing firms.  
To further examine firm motivations over time, we assign all event firms into quintiles based on 
each of the above three characteristics (B/M, the prior 12-month return, and size). The quintile 
breakpoints are constructed from all CRSP firms in the same month (NYSE firms for the size 
quintiles). Consequently, the distribution of event firms across quintiles is not even. We examine the 
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distributions before and after 2002 and try to infer whether firms‟ motivations for the events have 
changed over the two time periods. Panel B of Table 5 presents the percentage distribution of event 
firms in quintiles sorted on B/M, the prior return, and the market cap, respectively. 
If stock undervaluation (overvaluation) is a primary motivation for share repurchases (SEOs), 
we would expect to observe that more of the repurchasing (SEO) firms fall into the high (low) B/M 
quintiles, and the low (high) prior-return quintiles. The evidence seems so for SEO firms but not 
much so for repurchasing firms. Almost a half of the SEO firms belong to the lowest B/M quintile, 
and if quintiles are sorted on the prior 12-month return, more than a half of the SEO firms fall into 
the highest prior-return quintile. The distribution of repurchasing firms is fairly even across both 
the B/M quintiles and the prior-return quintiles, with the middle three quintiles (quintile 2, 3, and 4) 
having slightly more observations. Exploiting mispricing, as a potential motivation for corporate 
stock transactions, seems more plausible for SEOs than for repurchases. Comparing the distribution 
after 2002 with that of the early years, we find that even fewer of the repurchasing firms fall into the 
high B/M quintiles (quintile 4 and 5) and fewer of the SEO firms fall into the low B/M quintiles 
(quintile 1 and 2), which presumably host suspects of market timers. The percentage of SEO firms 
belonging to the highest prior-return quintile drops from 58.63% in the early sample to 45.14% in 
the later sample (The distribution for repurchasing firms over the prior-return quintiles does not 
change much over the two periods). In short, if exploiting mispricing was an important motivation 
for these two events in the early years, it becomes less important after 2002.  
In untabulated results, we also compute long-run abnormal returns for event firms in each 
quintile, and find that, from the low to high B/M quintiles in the early sample, the abnormal returns 
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become more positive and significant for repurchases and become less negative and significant for 
SEOs. In other words, the superior return performance following repurchases is concentrated more 
in firms with high B/M, and the underperformance following SEOs is concentrated more in firms 
with low B/M. While the pattern for SEO firms remains after 2002 to some extent, the magnitude 
becomes significantly weaker. The pattern completely disappears for repurchasing firms. Under 
IRATS and BHAR, the abnormal returns following repurchases even become negative. Similar 
return results are found in quintiles sorted on the prior 12-month returns.  
4.2.2 Multivariate analysis of repurchase and SEO decisions 
In addition, we analyze firms‟ market-timing incentives in repurchase and SEO decisions in a 
multivariate framework. In particular, we run logit regressions on data for the full set of industrial 
firms in Compustat to assess whether the probability of a firm launching a repurchase (an SEO) is 
related to its industry-adjusted B/M equity ratios, the prior 12-month and future three-year stock 
returns in excess of the contemporaneous industry. For a given firm in a given year, the dependent 
variable equals 1 if it has made a repurchase (an SEO) announcement in that year and 0 otherwise. 
The three explanatory variables are often used in previous studies as proxies for managers‟ 
perception of mispricing (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2010). For the purpose of our 
research interest, we also include a post-2002 dummy (which equals one if the repurchase/SEO is 
announced after 2002 and zero otherwise) and interact the dummy with the three market-timing 
variables. If firms time the market in their SEO decision, we expect to observe a positive coefficient 
for the prior excess return and negative coefficients for the B/M ratio and the future excess returns; 
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and the opposite is expected to hold for repurchases. If event firms‟ market timing incentive 
weakens in the recent years, we expect these coefficients to subdue in magnitude. 
Table 6 presents the logit regression results. For SEOs, we find that the coefficient estimates on 
the three market-timing variables have signs consistent with the market-timing hypothesis – a firm 
is more likely to conduct an SEO if its B/M is lower, its prior return is higher, and its future return 
is lower. However, the interaction of market-timing variables with the post-2002 dummy yield 
significant coefficient estimates with opposite signs. This suggests that firms‟ incentive of 
conducting SEOs to time the market becomes weaker after 2002. In fact, the prior and future excess 
returns fail to explain firms‟ decision of SEOs in the recent years.  The variable of B/M could also 
measure the firm‟s investment opportunities. For the decision of share repurchases, among the 
three market-timing variables, only the positive coefficient estimate on the future excess return is 
consistent with the market-timing hypothesis. Nevertheless, even this coefficient turns to be zero in 
the later period as the interaction term with the post-2002 dummy has the opposite sign with the 
identical magnitude. So we argue that market timing does not seem a convincing motivation for 
repurchases in the first place; if any, it also decays over time.  
Combining the evidence in Tables 5 and 6, we argue that market timing becomes not as 
important as before as a motivation for either share repurchases or SEOs. In the recent years, we 
have fewer of undervalued repurchasing firms and fewer of overvalued SEO firms before the 
announcements. Moreover, even for those event firms still appearing to be under- or over-valued, 
we do not find that they consistently realize positive or negative abnormal returns in the long run. 
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The evidence suggests that corporate stock transactions in the recent years are perhaps done for 
purposes other than market timing.  
Besides the possibility of timing the market, firms distribute excess cash to shareholders through 
share repurchases. Recent studies, such as Grullon and Michaely (2002), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner (2008), and Skinner (2008), show that over time firms rely more on repurchases than 
dividends in payout to shareholders. Similarly, firms conduct SEOs perhaps for the purpose of 
raising investment capital (Kim and Weisbach, 2008) or saving cash (McLean, 2010), rather than 
timing the market. McLean (2010) even argues that the precautionary motives in saving cash are 
strengthened in recent years.  
4.3. The implication of announcement returns 
 If the market becomes more efficient recently, the information content of the repurchase/SEO 
announcement declines. That is, part of the information has been already incorporated in the stock 
prices upon the announcement because institutions would trade on their information about the firm 
value before the announcement. As such, it is possible to observe less significant price reactions at 
the announcement. Furthermore, firms‟ weaker capability in timing the market as a result of 
improved market efficiency would also suggest a reduction in the information content of event 
announcements, which contributes to the subdued market response as well. We examine event 
announcement returns to explore the answers. 
We calculate the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the repurchase and SEO 
announcement date, i.e., CAR[-1, +1], using the market model and the CRSP value-weighted return 
as the market return. Table 7 reports the results of CARs. Consistent with previous studies on the 
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announcement returns of these two events, we find that repurchasing firms realize positive returns 
and SEO firms incur negative returns at announcement. Both are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Further, we find that both the mean and median CARs for repurchases (SEOs) after 2002 
become less positive (negative) than those in the early sample. The differences, except that of the 
mean CARs for SEOs, are statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with the reduced 
information content of these corporate stock transactions. More firms refrain from using SEOs and 
repurchases to time the market, perhaps as a rational reaction to the improved market efficiency.  
To further pin down how the weaker market response is related to the change in firms‟ market-
timing incentives, we run a multiple regression of announcement returns on market-timing 
variables (prior 12-month return and M/B), together with firm and deal characteristics that help to 
explain the variation in announcement returns. In particular, the independent variables include the 
event firm size, industry, investment opportunity, cash holding, leverage, profitability, return in the 
previous year, return volatility, capital expenditure, as well as the deal size. Our key variable of 
interest is the post-2002 dummy. We expect that the market responses before and after 2002 would 
not differ significantly after controlling for market-timing and characteristic variables. That is, the 
univariate difference in CARs before and after 2002 is fully subdued by the change in market-timing 
variables over the periods. Table 8 presents the regression results. Indeed, the coefficient of the post-
2002 dummy is not statistically different from zero.  Our evidence confirms the shifting incentives 
of corporate stock transactions. 
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Overall, our finding that the market responds to repurchase/SEO announcements less 
significantly, combined with the disappearance of the long-run price drift documented earlier, is 
consistent with an improvement in market efficiency more recently.   
 
5.   Conclusion 
Early studies have documented significant stock return outperformance following repurchases 
and underperformance following SEOs. The evidence is robust to various estimation methods of 
long-run abnormal returns, and is often explained jointly by market inefficiency and firms‟ 
incentive of market timing. Firms buy back shares when undervalued and sell additional stocks 
when overvalued. Investors in the market fail to incorporate the information fully at the 
announcement, and as a result, significant long-run abnormal returns are observed, in particular, 
outperformance following repurchases and underperformance following SEOs.  
In this study, we find that the long-run abnormal returns largely disappear in the sample after 
2002. Neither outperformance following repurchases nor underperformance following SEOs is 
consistently observed. The evidence is also robust to different estimations of long-run abnormal 
returns. Further analyses suggest that the stock market becomes more efficient in the recent years. 
The substantially increased stock ownership and trading activities by institutional investors, 
facilitated by the reduced trading costs and the improved trading technology, help to prevent and 
eliminate mispricing and make the pricing more efficient in general. In response to the improved 
market efficiency, fewer repurchases and SEOs are conducted for the purpose of timing the market. 
The findings of long-run abnormal returns do not persist over time. The players in the stock market, 
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the incentives of corporations, and the market itself evolve over time. Our findings suggest a more 
dynamic view on the stock market and the market efficiency. 
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Table 1   
The distribution of stock repurchases and seasoned equity offerings by calendar years 
 
This table presents the distribution of our sample stock repurchases and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by 
calendar years. Our sample of repurchases contains 14,538 open-market repurchases of common stocks  
during the period from January 1985 to December 2010. Repurchases by tender offers or private negotiation 
are excluded from the sample. If a firm makes multiple announcements in a year, only the first announcement 
is counted. Our sample of SEOs includes 6,645 issues of common stocks by industrial firms (not by financial 
institutions or utility firms) during the period from January 1980 to December 20 10. 
 
Year Repurchases SEOs 
1980  211 
1981  214 
1982  168 
1983  473 
1984  101 
1985 115 191 
1986 165 208 
1987 689 154 
1988 223 63 
1989 439 117 
1990 696 80 
1991 265 254 
1992 418 231 
1993 420 298 
1994 742 216 
1995 759 329 
1996 1010 394 
1997 870 333 
1998 1399 196 
1999 1083 269 
2000 616 272 
2001 509 156 
2002 347 134 
2003 352 174 
2004 433 182 
2005 494 147 
2006 459 145 
2007 719 128 
2008 770 79 
2009 201 403 
2010 345 325 
Total 14,538 6,645 
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Table 2   
Long-run abnormal returns following share repurchase and SEO announcements 
 
This table reports  the abnormal returns in 36 months following the repurchase and SEO announcements. 
Long-run abnormal returns are estimated using three methods: (1) calendar-time portfolio approach; (2) 
Ibbotson‟s (1975) return across time and securities (IRATS); and (3) the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR)  
relative to the control firms matched on size and the book-to-market equity ratio. The estimation details can 
be found in Section 2.2. The long-run abnormal returns are estimated for the full sample,  i.e., 1985-2010 for 
repurchases and 1980-2010 for SEOs, as well as separately for the early sample (as of 2002) and the later 
sample (2003-2010). The associated t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The last column reports the 
number (and the percentage) of sample observations in each sample period. Panel A is for repurchasing firms 
and Panel B for SEO firms. 
 
Panel A: Long-run abnormal returns following stock repurchases 
Sample period Calendar time IRATS BHAR(median) N (%) 
1985-2010 0.24%*** 11.95%*** 10.37 % 14,538 (100%) 
 (2.91) (15.67) (10.58)  
1980-2002 0.22%** 13.41%*** 14.50% 10,765 (74.0%) 
 (2.29) (14.75) 
(12.23) 
 
2003-2010 0.05% 1.49% -2.31% 3,773 (26.0%) 
 (0.40) (1.03) 
(-1.25) 
 
 
Panel B: Long-run abnormal returns following SEOs 
Sample period Calendar time IRATS BHAR(median) N (%) 
1980-2010 -0.38%*** -20.09%*** -11.32% 6,645 (100%) 
 (-3.08) (-13.85) (-7.74)  
1980-2002 -0.40%*** -21.96%*** -12.67% 5,062 (76.2%) 
 (-2.89) (-13.78) 
(-8.45) 
 
2003-2010 -0.19% -6.46%* -4.65% 1,583 (23.8%) 
 (-0.74) (-1.68) (-1.09)  
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Table 3  
Institutional ownership of repurchasing and SEO firms over time 
 
The table presents the number and the percentage of event firms whose institutional ownership at the quarter 
end before the announcement is below 50% (low IO) or above 50% (high IO). Institutional ownership is the 
percentage of outstanding shares held by institutions in aggregate. Panel A reports the distributions by 
calendar years, and Panel B summarizes them into the full, the early, and the later sample periods.  
Panel A: The distribution by calendar years  
Year 
Repurchases SEOs 
N(low IO) N(high IO) %(low IO)  %(high IO) N(low IO) N(high IO) %(low IO)  %(high IO) 
1980     170 6 96.6% 3.4% 
1981     195 11 94.7% 5.3% 
1982     152 13 92.1% 7.9% 
1983     424 40 91.4% 8.6% 
1984     93 5 94.9% 5.1% 
1985 90 25 78.3% 21.7% 174 11 94.1% 5.9% 
1986 110 54 67.1% 32.9% 181 21 89.6% 10.4% 
1987 509 177 74.2% 25.8% 123 29 80.9% 19.1% 
1988 159 63 71.6% 28.4% 54 7 88.5% 11.5% 
1989 318 121 72.4% 27.6% 99 16 86.1% 13.9% 
1990 520 175 74.8% 25.2% 68 10 87.2% 12.8% 
1991 192 73 72.5% 27.5% 191 61 75.8% 24.2% 
1992 263 152 63.4% 36.6% 172 57 75.1% 24.9% 
1993 263 154 63.1% 36.9% 219 74 74.7% 25.3% 
1994 500 241 67.5% 32.5% 145 66 68.7% 31.3% 
1995 499 259 65.8% 34.2% 222 107 67.5% 32.5% 
1996 657 350 65.2% 34.8% 291 100 74.4% 25.6% 
1997 533 335 61.4% 38.6% 242 91 72.7% 27.3% 
1998 899 495 64.5% 35.5% 128 65 66.3% 33.7% 
1999 688 388 63.9% 36.1% 168 95 63.9% 36.1% 
2000 364 250 59.3% 40.7% 175 97 64.3% 35.7% 
2001 306 200 60.5% 39.5% 71 85 45.5% 54.5% 
2002 176 171 50.7% 49.3% 49 84 36.8% 63.2% 
2003 174 177 49.6% 50.4% 86 88 49.4% 50.6% 
2004 144 289 33.3% 66.7% 82 100 45.1% 54.9% 
2005 132 360 26.8% 73.2% 65 81 44.5% 55.5% 
2006 125 332 27.4% 72.6% 64 81 44.1% 55.9% 
2007 176 543 24.5% 75.5% 50 78 39.1% 60.9% 
2008 214 555 27.8% 72.2% 22 57 27.8% 72.2% 
2009 71 129 35.5% 64.5% 209 189 52.5% 47.5% 
2010 74 271 21.5% 78.5% 229 94 70.9% 29.1% 
 
Panel B: The distribution by the early and later sample periods 
Sample 
Repurchases SEOs 
N(low IO) N(high IO) %(low IO) %(high IO) N(low IO) N(high IO) %(low IO) %(high IO) 
Full sample 
8156 6339 56.27% 43.73% 4613 1919 70.62% 29.38% 
Early sample 
7046 3683 65.67% 34.33% 3806 1151 76.78% 23.22% 
Later sample 1286 2827 31.27% 68.73% 807 768 51.24% 48.76% 
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Table 4   
Institutional ownership and long-run abnormal returns 
 
Event firms are classified into the low IO and high  IO groups based on if their institutional ownership (IO) in  
the quarter before the announcement is below or above 50%. The long -run abnormal returns are separately 
reported for the low and high IO groups, in the full, the early, and the later samples. The statistical 
significance is marked by *, **, and ***, corresponding to the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
 
 
Calendar time IRATS BHAR (median) 
Low IO High IO Low IO High IO Low IO High IO 
Panel A: Repurchases 
Full sample 0.29%*** 0.18%** 15.31%*** 5.88%*** 13.32%*** 6.58%*** 
Early sample 0.32%*** 0.10% 18.18%*** 8.37%*** 16.32%*** 11.54%*** 
Later sample -0.04% 0.06% -10.86%*** -0.73% -9.08%* -0.99% 
Panel B: SEOs 
Full sample -0.49%*** -0.19% -22.81%*** -9.22%*** -13.09%*** -10.20%*** 
Early sample -0.40%** -0.31%* -21.59%*** -19.31%*** -15.84%*** -10.22%*** 
Later sample -0.54% 0.05% -20.86%*** 5.39% -8.45%* 1.20% 
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Table 5  
Panel A: The industry-adjusted B/M, prior 12-month return, and size of event firms 
 
This table presents the industry-adjusted book-to-market equity ratio, prior 12-month return and market 
capitalization of event firms. B/M is constructed using the book value of equity in the previous fiscal year end 
and the market capitalization in the previous month end before the announcement.  The prior 12 -month 
return is the buy-and-hold return in the 12 months before the announcement. Size is measured as the market 
capitalization in the previous month end, in logarithm. We adjust the event firm B/M and market cap by 
subtracting the contemporaneous industry median, and adjust the prior 12 -month return by subtracting the 
contemporaneous  buy-and-hold value-weighted industry portfolio return. The last row reports  the difference 
in these three variables between the later and early samples. T -tests are used to test the significance of means 
and the difference in means. The statistic significance is marked by *, **, and ***, corresponding to the 
significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Samples 
Repurchases SEOs 
B/M 
Prior 
return 
Market cap B/M 
Prior 
return 
Market cap 
Full sample 0.05*** -0.07*** 1.12*** -0.12*** 0.66*** 0.88*** 
Early sample 0.07*** -0.09*** 1.13*** -0.14*** 0.70*** 1.10*** 
Later sample 0.01 -0.01 1.11*** -0.04* 0.51*** 0.22*** 
Difference -0.05*** 0.08*** -0.01 0.10*** -0.20*** -0.88*** 
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Table 5 
Panel B: Firm distribution across characteristic quintiles  
 
This table presents the distribution of event firms across firm characteristics quintiles. We assign event firms into quintiles based on their characteristics – B/M equity 
ratio, prior 12-month return, and market capitalization, one at a time. The breakpoints for size quintiles are constructed from NYSE firms in the same month as the 
announcement of the event  The breakpoints for B/M and prior 12-month return quintiles are constructed from all CRSP firms.                 
 
Repurchases    SEOs 
B1: Percent of observations in B/M quintiles     B1: Percent of observations in B/M quintiles  
   B/M 
lowest 
B/M 2  B/M 3  B/M 4  B/M 
highest 
   B/M  
lowest 
B/M 2  B/M 3  B/M 4  B/M  
highest 
Full sample 17.58% 24.52% 24.39% 21.94% 11.57%    46.08% 25.98% 15.29% 8.77% 3.88% 
Early sample 15.85% 24.01% 25.08% 22.68% 12.37%    46.37% 27.11% 15.25% 7.78% 3.48% 
Later sample 22.34% 25.94% 22.47% 19.90% 9.35%    45.11% 22.30% 15.40% 12.01% 5.18% 
     
B2: Percent of observations in prior-return quintile      B2: Percent of observations in prior-return quintiles 
   Lowest 
prior- 
return 
Prior-
return 2  
Prior-
return 3  
Prior-
return 4  
Highest 
prior-
return 
   Lowest prior- 
return 
Prior-return 2 Prior-return 3 Prior-return 4 Highest 
prior-return 
Full sample 15.70% 23.44% 23.17% 22.32% 15.37%    7.76% 8.43% 10.15% 18.46% 55.21% 
Early sample 15.64% 23.03% 23.38% 22.93% 15.01%    4.05% 7.28% 10.10% 19.93% 58.63% 
Later sample 15.85% 24.56% 22.58% 20.65% 16.36%    18.94% 11.91% 10.28% 14.01% 44.86% 
     
B3: Percent of observations in size quintiles     B3: Percent of observations in size quintiles  
   Smallest 
size 
Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Largest 
size 
   Smallest size Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Largest size 
Full sample 33.81% 16.81% 14.60% 14.87% 19.91%    28.43% 27.42% 21.79% 14.97% 7.40% 
Early sample 36.35% 16.42% 14.31% 14.14% 18.77%    26.71% 26.01% 23.12% 16.21% 7.95% 
Later sample 26.56% 17.94% 15.41% 16.95% 23.15%    33.84% 31.87% 17.59% 11.05% 5.65% 
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Table 6  
Logit regression of SEO and repurchase decisions 
 
The table presents the results of logit regressions of SEO and repurchase decisions in a given year on the 
firm‟s most recent industry-adjusted book-to-market equity ratio, industry-adjusted stock returns over the 
prior year and the subsequent three years, and a year dummy, which equals 1 for firms after 2002 and 0 
otherwise, and also the interaction of the year dummy with the other variables. For a given firm in a given 
year, the dependent variable equals 1 if it has made an SEO (a repurchase) announcement in that year and 0 
otherwise. Industry-adjusted B/M is the firm‟s raw B/M divided by the median B/M for all firms in  the same 
industry for the fiscal year end that falls closet to,  but no later than, December 31 of the prior year. Prior 
(Future) excess return is the compound stock return of the prior 12 months (the following three years) minus 
the contemporary value-weighted industry return. Firms in  the regression are required to have at least 7  non-
missing monthly returns in a year, from the pool of all firm-year observations for all CRSP/Compustat 
industrial firms. The table reports the estimated coefficients and the associated  t-statistics in the parentheses. 
The sample period is 1980-2007 for SEOs and 1985-2007 for repurchases. 
 
 Repurchases SEOs 
Intercept 
-2.24  -2.68  
(-87.63) (-59.07) 
Ind-adj B/M 
-0.16  -0.65  
(-14.79) (-22.32) 
Prior excess return 
0.03  0.02  
-14.89 -9.88  
Future excess return 
0.01  -0.03  
-5.3 (-8.04) 
Dummy (Year>=2003) 
0.30  -0.35  
-4.36 (-2.65) 
B/M*Dummy 
-0.13  -0.04  
(-4.45) (-0.46) 
Prior return*Dummy 
-0.01  -0.02  
(-3.56) (-2.45) 
Future return*Dummy 
-0.01  0.04  
(-2.33) (-3.42) 
 
Number  of observations 
 
117,468 
 
39 
 
136,588 
 
Pseudo R-squared (%) 
 
1.10 
 
102 
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Table 7 
Cumulative abnormal returns at announcement 
 
This table reports the mean and median three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement 
date for repurchasing and SEO firms, i.e., CAR[-1, +1]. Abnormal return is estimated using the conventional 
market model with the CRSP value-weighted return as the market portfolio. The announcement cumulative 
abnormal returns are estimated for the full sample, i.e., 1985-2010 for repurchases and 1980-2010 for SEOs, as 
well as separately for the early sample (as of 2002) and the later sample (2003 -2010). The last row reports the 
difference in  CAR between the later and early samples.  We test the significance of means and the difference in  
means by t-test, the significance of medians by Wilcoxon signed ranks test, and the significance of difference 
in medians by Wilcoxon rank sum test. The statistic significance is marked by *, **, and ***, corresponding to 
the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Samples  
Repurchases SEOs 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Full sample 2.43%*** 1.60%*** -2.77%*** -2.74%*** 
Early sample 2.65%*** 1.76%*** -2.85%*** -2.87%*** 
Later sample 1.82%*** 1.27%*** -2.55%*** -2.38%*** 
Difference -0.82%*** -0.49%*** 0.30% 0.49%** 
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Table 8 
Regression of the cumulative abnormal return at announcement  
 
This table reports the regression results. The dependent variable of the regression is CAR[-1, +1], the three-
day cumulative abnormal return at announcement. The explanatory variables include a time dummy (Post-
2002), which is set to be 1 if the announcement occurs in 2003-2010 and to be 0  otherwise, Total assets in logs, 
B/M (the book-to-market equity ratio, in which the book value is measured at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement and the market value is measured as the month end before the announcement), Cash/Assets 
(cash and marketable securities divided by total assets in the previous fiscal year), Debt/Assets (long-term 
debt divided by total assets), EBITDA/Assets, Prior 12-month return (the compound return in the 12 months 
before the announcement), Return volatility (the standard deviation of daily returns in  the previous  12 
months), CAPX/Assets ( the sum of capital expenditures in the following three years divided by total assets 
in the previous fiscal year), Proceeds/ME (transaction value scaled by market capitalization before 
announcement), and industry dummies. Industries are classified as in Fama and French (1997). The top and 
bottom 0.5% of observation values in each year are replaced by the value at the 99.5 and 0.5 percentiles. The 
associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
 Repurchases SEOs 
Intercept 
2.60 -4.62 
(5.31) (-7.20) 
Post-2002 dummy  
0.06 0.17 
(0.38) (0.61) 
Log(Assets) 
-0.13 0.12 
(-3.46) (11.56) 
B/M 
0.85 0.55 
(5.99) (2.77) 
Cash/Assets 
-0.25 0.08 
(-0.40) (0.14) 
Debt/Assets  
0.18 0.55 
(0.35) (0.98) 
EBITDA/Assets  
-2.64 0.41 
(-4.96) (2.15) 
Prior 12-month return  
-2.46 -0.27 
(-15.22) (-43.82) 
Return volatility 
96.36 -4.06 
(18.02) (-0.78) 
3-year CAPX/Assets  
0.26 0.15 
(0.72) (1.37) 
Proceeds/ME 
5.28 2.63 
(6.11) (4.63) 
Industry dummy yes yes 
Number  of observations  14463 5421 
R-squared (%) 7.69 1.46 
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Figure 1  
The time series of institutional ownership in 1980-2010 
 
This figure plots the median institutional ownership of repurchasing and SEO firms, measured at 
the quarter end before the announcement, and the median institutional ownership of all CRSP 
stocks during the period 1980-2010. The data is based on Thomson Financial‟s 13f. 
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